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ABSTRACT

The McDonnell Douglas DC-10 aircraft has been plagued
by a series of problems throughout its history that has shaken
customer confidence and resulted in many cancelled orders.
Since the DC-10 represents a large portion of the corporation's
revenue, it is essential that the firm continue to sell the
aircraft near previously projected rates.

This has created a

case of crisis marketing for the company.
This study will use the DC-10 case to present a
general crisis marketing model.

This model will be a

step-by-step framework that can be applied to most crisis
marketing situations.
By using this model and seeing it applied to the DC-10
case, managers should now be able to approach a crisis
marketing situation in a more logical and organized manner.

vi
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CHAPTER I
THE RESEARCH PROJECT

Introduction

The McDonnell Douglas DC-10 has experienced a series
of problems since its introduction into the commercial aircraft
market during the early 70's.
crashes since 1974.

There have been four major

The disaster at Chicago's O'Hare Airport

in 1979 resulted in a costly grounding of the DC-10 while
specific design certifications were studied.

A resulting

inspection program revealed other damaged aircraft of this
type.

In addition, several other less severe incidents

involving the DC-10 have also occurred throughout its history.
This research project examines the case of the DC-10
in terms of marketing efforts which followed this string of
accidents.

This is the basis for the term "crisis marketing";

the attempt to market a product after extreme negative
publicity, conspicuous failure, or any other event which
injures customer relations and general public opinion to a high
degree.

This case is used as a model to derive general

conclusions about crisis marketing and to provide an example
with which other firms involved in crisis marketing can use to

1
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make comparisons.
Chapter I will introduce the project and state the
problem.

This will be followed by a discussion of the scope,

limitations, and justification of the project.
be review of the literature.

Chapter II will

The purpose is to build the case

by presenting facts concerning the McDonnell Douglas
Corporation, the DC-10 aircraft and its history, and the
results of the DC-10 problems with respect to specific
customers and the public.
crisis marketing model.
this framework.

Chapter III will present a general
The DC-10 case will then be applied to

Chapter IV will review and summarize the

project.
Statement of Problem
The DC-10 accidents and related events have served to
shaken the confidence of established customers.

McDonnell

Douglas also has had orders for the DC-10 cancelled as a
consequence of the Chicago crash and resulting publicity.
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)

The

investigations and

several court battles in the summer of 1979 caused additional
problems for the carriers using the DC-10 and adversely
influenced airlines planning to buy the aircraft in the future.
These facts are of grave importance to McDonnell
Douglas, as the DC-10 is an essential part of corporate sales.
It is the biggest and most advanced transport that the company
offers to the civilian and military markets.

In addition, the

corporation is expecting the DC-10 to be its standard-bearer in
these markets well into the future.

3

The poor record of the DC-10, the reactions of
potential and current customers, and the importance of the
DC-10 to the corporation, have resulted in a case of crisis
marketing for McDonnell Douglas.

The failure to meet projected

sales levels for the aircraft would be a serious economic blow
to the entire company.

This will be a basic consideration in

applying the DC-10 model to the crisis marketing framework.
Scope and Limitation
This paper is concerned with analyzing the crisis
marketing case presented by the DC-10.

While other cases of

crisis marketing have certainly existed, this study limits
analysis to this specific case only.

The DC-10 case is an

excellent example from which to develop the concepts and
outline a model of crisis marketing.

Devoting efforts to one

case will allow comprehensive development, analysis, and
formulation of conclusions.
One important step in developing a crisis marketing
model is the selections of relevant factors likely to affect
future cases.

The factors chosen in analyzing the DC-10 case

represent those which will impact upon most crisis marketing
situations.

They include characteristics of the producer,

product, customers, and a history of product problems.

These

broad areas will make the model generally applicable to a wide
variety of situations.

The DC-10 case provides a basis for the

selection of key factors.

If another case had been selected,

however, the factors and resulting model would still be
substantially the same.

4

This paper presents a crisis marketing outline
developed to provide information and guidance to managers who
become involved in a crisis marketing situation.

In preparing

the paper, information from a wide variety of sources was
collected and organized into a single useful model.

The DC-10

case is provided as a practical application.
The era of consumerism and increasing government
regulations on product performance combined with the public's
dependence on technical products increase the prospects for
more crisis marketing situations in the future.

This paper can

serve as a basis for more research in the area.
Summary
This chapter has outlined the format that this paper
will follow.

The problem identified concerns the continued

successful marketing of the DC-10 following a series of
accidents involving the aircraft.

A crisis marketing model

will be developed and the facts of the DC-10 case will be used
to demonstrate how the model can work in actual crisis
marketing situations.

The DC-10 case was selected as it is one

of the most dramatic and visible cases of crisis marketing in
recent history.

By limiting analysis to only one case,

however, the model developed may not be totally adaptable to
all situations.
required.

A manager may wish to modify certain steps as

1
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND FACTS OF THE CASE:
A Review of the Literature
Introduction

This chapter will provide the necessary background
facts to explore the DC-10 case.

This information is essential

in order to make general conclusions and specific comparisons in
preparing the model.

The areas discussed below are limited to

those which will be the most relevant and useful in examining
this case.
The first area of importance deals with the McDonnell
Douglas Corporation itself.

In analyzing a case of crisis

marketing, the size, financial position, organization, and
products of the firm are all important in making recommendations
or comparisons.

The size and relevant importance of the DC-10

project to the corporation will be examined next.

This is due

to the fact that most manufacturing firms produce a variety of
products and if one becomes involved in a crisis marketing
situation, its relative place within the company's product mix
becomes another important factor to consider.
A chronological history of the DC-lOs problems is
presented in the next section.

This involves discussing the

5

6

circumstances and details of four major crashes and a variety of
lesser mishaps.

The events taking place after the 1979 crashes

are presented next with an emphasis on causes and resulting
customer reactions.

Knowing the case of a product's problems is

a basic element in planning a crisis marketing strategy.
Analyzing customer reactions will help provide the specific
objectives of the effort.

In addition, isolating specific

causes of the problems and reviewing the customer attitudes will
again form a basis for comparison in Chapter IV.
The McDonnell Douglas Corporation
The McDonnell Douglas Corporation resulted from a 1967
merger of the McDonnell Company and the Douglas Aircraft
Company.

McDonnell was incorporated in 1939 and had its

headquarters in St. Louis.

They had produced several types of

high-quality fighter aircraft and were prime contractors on the
Mercury and Gemini spacecraft.

Douglas was based in southern

California and the financially troubled firm primarily built
commercial transport aircraft.

The McDonnell family retained a

controlling interest in the newly formed McDonnell Douglas
Corporation.
The company has traditionally relied heavily on the
military market.

Current projects include the F-4 Phantom, F-15

air-superiority fighter, F-18 naval strike aircraft, AV-BB
Marine STOL aircraft, Harpoon anti-ship missile, and the
Tomahawk cruise missile.

The fiscal 1980 Department of Defense

funding requests provided evidence as to the importance of the
military sector to the company.

For example, the budget called

7

for $989.5 million for 60 F-15 aircraft, spare parts, and
additional research and development.

The Navy requested $1.044

billion for 15 F/A-18's, which also included spare parts and
additional development.

F-4 procurement continued and accounted

for $85.5 million, while the Harpoon program sought funds
totaling $154.7 million.

1

Additional funds were requested for

other McDonnell Douglas projects such as the KC-10 tanker,
Tomahawk, AV-SB, and the Delta space booster.
In the civilian sector, the company produces the DC-9
and DC-10 transports.

Both of these aircraft have been sold to

the military under the designations of C-9 and DC-10,
respectively.

The DC-9 has been an extremely popular aircraft,

with the 1000th order being received in early 1979.
The company's production facilities are located
primarily in California and Missouri, the former headquarters of
McDonnell and Douglas Aircraft.

Plants are also located in

Florida, Oklahoma, England, Barbados, Canada, and Puerto Rico.
Wholly-owned subsidiaries of McDonnell Douglas include the
McDonnell Douglas Finance Corporation, McDonnell Douglas of
Canada, Ltd., McDonnell Douglas Corporation Realty, and Vitek
Systems, Inc.

In addition, the company is divided into the

following divisions:

Douglas Aircraft Company, McDonnell

Douglas-Tulsa, McDonnell Douglas Electronics, McDonnell Aircraft
Company, McDonnell Douglas Astronautics, McDonnell Douglas

l•Major Weapon System Spending Detailed," Aviation Week
Space Technology. 29 January 1979, p. 22.

&

FIGURE 1

McDONNELL DOUGLAS CORPORATION
Consolidated Balance Sheet
December 31, 1979

Assets:

($000's omitted)

Cash, etc.
Short-term invest.
Receivables
Cont. in process
and Inventory
Prepays
Total Curr.
Net Property
Leased Aircraft

292,877
34,269
395,947
1,846,971
10,737

Liabilities:

Accounts payable, etc.

621,138

Employee compensation

151,454

Income taxes

616,060

Adv. on cont.

142,290

Contract adjustments

377,591

Total Curr.

2,580,803
449,295
33,069

($OOO's omitted)

1,915,656

Long-term debt

86,742

Common stock

38,725

Capital surplus

325,779

Investments

232,772

Other Assets

39,046

Retained Earnings

1,030,883

Def. charges

45,620

Stockholder Equity

1,395,387

Reacquired stock
17,180
Net Stockholder equ. 1,378,207
TOTAL

TOTAL

3,380,604

3,380,604

SOURCE: Robert P. Hanson, ed., Moody's Industrial
Manual, Vol. 2, (New York: Moody's Investor's Service, Inc.,
1980), p. 4957.
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Automation, and Microdata Company.
The 1979 fourth quarter profits for McDonnell Douglas
jumped 18% over the same period of the previous year.

Sales

also rose from $1.17 billion to $1.33 billion for a 14%
increase.

Profits were up 24% over the entire year of 1979 and

the yearly jump in sales was over $1 billion, which equated to a
28% increase.

2

The 1979 figures are used as they best

represent the financial position of McDonnell Douglas during the
peak of the DC-10 crisis.

Chairman James S. McDonnell cited

high sales, interest income, and lower effective taxes as the
reasons for his company's success during the year. 3
The sales of 1979 make McDonnell Douglas the 54th
largest American industrial corporation.

The firm is 65th in

assets, 86th in net income, and 35th in terms of number of
employees.

4

The future for the corporation looks relatively
bright.

Much of this is due to the strong pro-defense mood

present within the Reagan Administration.

Large outlays are

expected in the areas of fighter aircraft and airlift
capability, both strong areas for McDonnell Douglas.

Future

company plans in the civilian sector include a possible

2"McDonnell Douglas Profit Jumped 18% in the Fourth
Period," The Wall Street Journal, 28 January 1980, p. 2.
3rbid.
4"The Fortune Directory of the 500 Largest U.S.
Industrial Corporations," Fortune, 5 May 1980, p. 278.

10
''stretched" DC-10, an economical SST, and some type of
competition for Boeing's 757 and 767.
The DC-10 Project
The DC-10 is a critical program to the McDonnell
Douglas Corporation.

It is one of only two primary on-going

company projects in the civilian sector.

The size and

complexity of the aircraft required large initial outlays in
research and development and tooling for production.

There is

very little commonality with the DC-9 and this was also a
contributing factor to the high initial costs for the program.
A major incentive in designing and building the DC-10
was to fulfill an American Airlines design specification.

This

demand seemed to indicate high sales early in the production
cycle of the aircraft would be possible.

American Airlines was

seeking a wide-bodied aircraft that was small enough to land at
La Guardia Airport, but possessing sufficient range to reach
Dallas from New York.

The DC-10 design met the specifications

and American became one of McDonnell Douglas's best customers.
The DC-10 has reached the break-even point.

5

The

original break-even point was set at five hundred copies.

At

that point in time, McDonnell Douglas estimated that they could
sell 1,200 DC-lOs. 6

The break-even point was revised to

5The DC-8 never did reach the break-even point.
The DC-9
had not yet as of early 1980, but was expected to reach
break-even soon thereafter.
6"News Digest," Aviation week & Space Technology, 9
October 1972, p. 22.
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its present level of four hundred aircraft in 1979.

7

This

level was reached during 1981 based on actual deliveries and
firm sales orders.
At the start of 1979, the year in which three DC-lOs
were to crash, McDonnell Douglas had delivered 263 DC-lOs and
had firm orders for 320 more. 8

In addition, the Air Force was

expected to buy at least twenty more over the next five years.
Ironically, the first order for a DC-10 in 1979 was from Ariana
Afgan Airlines.
Kabul.

It was a cargo version intended to serve

At the start of 1979, there were forty-four airlines,

governments and agencies using the DC-10.

9

The large volume of back-orders caused McDonnell
Douglas to increase production of the DC-10.

The production

level at the Long Beach plant was 2.5 aircraft per month at the
end of 1978.
1979.

This was soon increased to 3.3 planes per month in

10
The nearest competition for the DC-10 is the Boeing 747

and the Lockheed L-1011.

Comparisons are based on size, range,

cost to operate, and capacity.
similar category.

These three planes are all in a

The Airbus was excluded from consideration

7Lee Smith, "They've Turned Off the Seat-belt Sign at
McDonnell Douglas,• Fortune, 17 December 1979, p. 62.
B•McDonnell Douglas Increases DC-9, DC-10 Production
Rate," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 January 1979, p. 32.
9rbid.
lOrbid.
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for several reasons.

It is only a two-engine aircraft and is

much smaller than the other three.
capacity and a shorter range.

This results in less

The Airbus is not intended to

serve the long routes that the DC-10, 747, and L-1011 fly.
advantage for the Airbus is its lower cost to operate.

11

An
This

is another reason, however, why it should not be directly
compared to the DC-10.
The DC-10, 747, and the L-1011 all carry a three-man
crew.

Different airlines designate crew members with various

titles, but all three aircraft generally have a pilot, copilot,
and flight engineer or navigator.

The standard 747 carries the

largest number of passengers of the three, with one version of
the 747 capable of accommodating 516 people.

12

The L-1011 and

DC-10 both can carry in the vicinity of 250-400 passengers.

The

747 also has an advantage in the amount of cargo that can be
carried by the transport versions.

The 747 is the largest of

the three, with the DC-10 and L-1011 nearly identical in size.
With the exception of the 747SP, a specially modified long-range
version, the DC-10 has the longest range of the three aircraft
considered.
Generally, however, the Boeing 747 is more expensive to
operate than either the DC-10 or the L-1011.

During the last

quarter of 1978, for example, the cost of operating a 747

llnu.s. Commercial Transports," Aviation week
Technology, 12 March 1979, p. 129.
121bid.

&

Space
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averaged about $2,000 per hour.
oil, and taxes.

13

Most of this went for fuel,

Crew costs were the next largest expense item

followed by insurance.

Costs for the DC-10 were in the $1,300

per hour range, with the biggest reduction coming in the cost of
fuel when compared to the 747.
$1,350-$1,450 per hour range.

The L-1011 was in the
The savings in fuel for the DC-10

and the L-1011 resulted from the fact that they are three-engine
aircraft and the 747 is a four-engine aircraft.
The specifications show that the DC-10 and the L-1011
are in direct competition.

Cost and performance figures

previously cited favor the DC-10 in most cases.

The 747 is

bigger and more expensive, but still remains a serious rival for
the DC-10.
A variety of options are being considered for future
DC-lOs.

A two-engine model is being studied in a measure

designed to save fuel.

Another option is a Rolls-Royce powered

DC-10 using 30% British components.

McDonnell Douglas is also

looking at a stretched DC-10 designed to increase cargo capacity.
History of Problems
The DC-10 aircraft has been involved in a series of
accidents and mishaps beginning in 1972.

As will be shown, the

more disastrous of these events were not a direct result of
aircraft failure.

This is a very important point in planning

13•operating and Cost Data - 747, A300, DC-10, L-1011 Fourth Quarter, 1978," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 7 May
1979, pp. 36-37.
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the crisis marketing strategy for a product.

This will be

further developed in Chapter IV.
On June 12, 1972, an American Airlines DC-10 left
Detroit on a flight originating in Los Angeles.

Approximately

ten minutes after takeoff, a rapid decompression occurred with
the aircraft.

The pilot immediately returned to the airport and

made an emergency landing.

Nine passengers were slightly

injured disembarking from the aircraft.

Initial investigations

showed that the left rear cargo door had separated from the
aircraft.

As a result, the FAA issued an inspection order for

the cargo doors on all DC-10 aircraft, but no additional
discrepancies were found by any airline.
McDonnell Douglas issued an advisory requesting
operators to insure cargo door warning lights were operable and
that flight crews visually inspect the door prior to flight.
The following month, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB)

requested the Federal Aviation Administration to require

a modification on the cargo doors locking system.
Investigations had shown that the doors were not fully closed
and locked during the June 12 incident.
findings concurred with the NTSB report.

McDonnell Douglas
Their study had shown

that it was possible to close the cargo door without fully
extending the lockpins.

The ground crew had not fully closed

the cargo door on June 12 and aircraft equipment was not capable
of detecting the problem.
During August of 1972, two engine related inflight
emergencies occurred while McDonnell Douglas was testing new

15

versions of the DC-10.
August 14.

The first incident took place on

An engine cowling on a Series 10 model broke loose.

The engine was shut down and the aircraft landed safely.
Additional damage was later discovered and was believed to have
been caused by debris resulting from the separation of the
cowling.
Two days later, a Series 30 DC-10 experienced an
inflight engine failure.

Investigations showed a brazed

stiffner ring on the air tube inside the high pressure
compressor had failed.

A similar problem had occurred during

ground testing of another engine of this type.

The aircraft

made a successful landing using two engines and the flight
testing program was not delayed due to these events.
A National Airlines DC-10 made an emergency landing in
Albuquerque on November 3, 1973, after an engine partially
disintegrated in flight.

The problem was caused by the

ingestion of the inlet cowling.

Debris destroyed the engine and

caused an explosive decompression within the aircraft.
passenger was killed and 23 were injured.

One

This was the fourth

time that this type of engine had disintegrated.

General

Electric, the builder of the engine, was investigating similar
events which occurred during the McDonnell Douglas testing
previously mentioned.

A similar engine failure had also

occurred on a Continental DC-10 on May 2, 1972.
All airlines utilizing the CF6 engine to power its
DC-lOs inspected their aircraft following the Albuquerque

16
incident in compliance with an FAA-issued Airworthiness
Directive.

McDonnell Douglas also issued a similar request.

On March 3, 1974, Turkish Airlines flight 981 crashed
due to a faulty cargo door on a flight from Istanbul to London
after making a stop at Paris Orly Airport.

There were 346

fatalities and this was the largest aviation disaster to date.
The aircraft was reportedly climbing to 13,000 feet when it
disappeared from radar screens near Paris.

The flight crew did

not attempt contact with ground stations after this point.
DC-10 impacted about twenty miles north of Paris.

The

The left rear

cargo door, six bodies, and several seats were found nine miles
from the crash site.
An investigation team was assembled with members of the
French civil aviation authority working in conjunction with
Turkish officials.

Representatives from the National

Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), McDonnell Douglas, and
General Electric were also present.
The FAA immediately ordered mandatory compliance with
the previous McDonnell Douglas service bulletin dealing with the
cargo door problem.

Airlines subsequently began extensive

modifications of all cargo doors on their DC-10 aircraft.
In another incident four days later, a second Turkish
DC-10 terminated its flight due to an overheated GE CF6 engine.
One passenger died from a heart attack during the landing.
March 15, a false fire warning light caused another Turkish
DC-10 to return to Istanbul after fifteen minutes of flight.
Following the third incident, McDonnell Douglas and General

On

17
Electric officials flew to Turkey for talks with Turkish airline
representatives.

This was primarily due to a wave of negative

publicity in the Turkish press concerning the DC-10.
The cause of the Paris crash was eventually determined
to have been the separation of the left rear cargo door.

This

caused an explosive decompression in the cargo section which
buckled the cabin floor.

This resulted in the severing of the

aircraft's main flight control linkages.
A Philippine Airlines DC-10 blew one or more tires
while landing at Guam International Airport on April 22, 1979.
There was damage to the left main gear and one engine.
were no serious injuries.

There

Leaking patches on a tire liner were

believed to have allowed air to accumulate under the tire
tread.

This caused a sudden load shift during landing and at

least one tire disintegrated.
remaining damage.

Tire fragments caused the

Mixing Goodyear and Goodrich tires on the

same gear was cited as a possible secondary cause due to

,,
~
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The worst American aviation disaster in history took
place on May 25, 1979.

American Airlines flight 191 departing

Chicago's O'Hare Airport crashed during takeoff.

The eight

thousand feet ground run to rotation was normal.

At the moment

of lift-off, the number one engine broke loose and rolled back
over the left wing.

This damaged control surfaces on the

leading edge of the wing.

The cockpit recorder, which is

powered by the number one engine, ceased operating at this
point.

The aircraft reached six hundred feet before rolling

,
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onto its left wing and crashing 1.5 miles north of the airport.
A total of 275 people were killed.
Investigations subsequently revealed that the pylon
holding the number one engine to the left wing had sheared bolts
and severe cracks present prior to the May 25 flight.

A debate

followed as to the cause of this damage which led to the
separation of the engine during flight.
John Brizendine, president of the Douglas Aircraft
Company division of McDonnell Douglas, testified to a House of
Representatives subcommittee on aviation that the cracks in the
pylon bulkhead were "caused by external forces not natural to
the aircraft.•

14

He pointed to maintenance procedures used by

American Airlines as the reason for the development of the
damage.

This charge was later supported by FAA Administrator

Langhorne Bond.
the pylon.

"We are very sure of the maintenance abuse of

The evidence is overwhelming.• 15

The FAA also

began a design review of the DC-10 in order to ascertain other
r;,

contributing factors and issued inspection orders for all
operators of DC-lOs.
Three days after the Chicago crash, pylon damage was
discovered on a United Airlines DC-10 by two mechanics complying
with the FAA inspection orders.

They noticed fine gray metal

14•Ground Handling Cited in Pylon Failure," Aviation Week
& Space Technology, 25 June 1979, p. 35.
15"DC-10 Damage During Maintenance Claimed," Aviation Week
& Space Technology, 25 June 1979, p. 33.
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filings in the pylon's aftermount.
it to be loose.

A test of the engine showed

After removing panels, 27 fasteners holding the

pylon together were discovered missing.

They immediately

reported the damage and the FAA temporarily grounded all DC-lOs
within two hours.

Pylon cracks were also found on two American

Airlines DC-lOs in San Francisco.

The aircraft had passed

earlier visual inspections, but a dye penetrant revealed the
damage.

The cracks were determined to have been caused by

impact during maintenance and not fatigue from flight. 16
On June 6, the FAA suspended the DC-10 type
certificate.

This was a more serious and permanent step than

the previous temporary grounding.

The damage discovered during

the inspections of the DC-lOs was one reason for this action.
second reason was supposed gaps in fail-safe analysis of the
pylon during initial type certification.

The FAA was moving

aggressively beyond the maintenance problems previously
identified.
This extended grounding and design review led to a
round of criticism of the FAA.
official stated:

One anonymous industrial

"I believe the FAA will find that the

fail-safe analysis in place for the DC-10 was entirely adequate
and the issue will be whether the inspections required for this
area by the FAA were adequate, or whether they were complied

16navid M. North, "Criticism of FAA Maneuvers Mounts,"
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 25 June 1979, p. 33.

A
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The FAA actions also brought an angry response from

McDonnell Douglas.

They charged that the certificate suspension

was "drastic and unwarranted.•

18

The company additionally

pointed to the fact that their claim of unauthorized maintenance
was supported by the National Transportation Safety Board.
Eventually, the FAA gave up on the wing pylon
situation.

They could find no evidence of poor design or

inadequate testing.

The agency next turned its attention to the

leading edge slat system which was damaged by the engine upon
separating.

This brought further criticism from airlines and

McDonnell Douglas.

One airline official claimed that the FAA

was on "a fishing expedition.•

19

The FAA finally restored the DC-10 type certificate and
cleared the aircraft to fly on July 13, 1979, after a 38-day
grounding.

The agency's final findings stated that the engine

and pylon assembly should not be removed as a single unit by
maintenance personnel.

In addition, crews should not have used

a forklift for changing engines in the past and cited the need
for more comprehensive inspections prior to flights.

Only one

recommendation pertained to McDonnell Douglas directly.

The FAA

17rbid.
lBaavid M. North, "DC-10 Type Certificate Lifted,"
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 11 June 1979, p. 47.
19Robert R. Ropelewski, "FAA Probe Turns to DC-lO's Slat
System," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 9 June 1979, p. 30.
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suggested that the company reevaluate its engine design in order
to reduce the amount of critical maintenance necessary.

20

The grounding that resulted from the Chicago crash was
the most costly in history.

This specific series of events was

the pivotal point in the difficult history of the DC-10.

The

negative publicity was to increase by the end of the year, as
two more DC-lOs crashed within the next six months.
The first accident took place in late October at the
airport in Mexico City.

A Western Airlines flight enroute from

Los Angeles crashed with eighty persons on board.

A total of

seventy-five people were killed, including several on the
ground.
traffic.

The aircraft attempted to land on a runway closed to
The pilot had been warned by ground controllers that

he was approaching a runway that was under construction.

The

pilot acknowledged the message, but apparently misunderstood
it.

He continued the landing and struck a parked construction

vehicle.

Fog and smog were also a factor.

Several days later,

the FAA stated that the crash was not a structural problem with
the aircraft and cited the probability of pilot error.
The third DC-10 disaster of 1979 took place on November
27.

An Air New Zealand sightseeing flight crashed into Mt.

Erebus on the continent of Anarctica during an eleven-hour tour
originating in Auckland.

All 257 people aboard were killed.

The crash site was well outside of the aircraft's intended

2Dnavid M. North, "Future Grounding Impact Seen," Aviation
Week & Space Technology, 23 July 1979, p. 24.
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route.

Ray Thompson, Chief of the Antarctica Division of the

New Zealand Department of Scientific and Industrial Research
stated:

"It would seem there has been a substantial error in

navigation by the pilot. 0021

Thompson also ruled out the

possibility of structural or mechanical failure.

Although

premature at the time, this analysis was later corroborated by
an investigation.

Pilot error was listed as the cause.

The

finding of pilot error was important as it served to free
McDonnell Douglas of liability for the crash.

If a structural

defect had caused the accident, it would be an additional
problem to overcome in its crisis marketing efforts.
Customer Reactions and Relations
The troubled history of the DC-10 has had a pronounced
effect upon McDonnell Douglas customers.

The peak occurred

during and immediately following the Chicago crash and
grounding.

The two subsequent 1979 crashes, even though

attributable to pilot errors, extended the crisis for McDonnell
Douglas.

This section will examine the impact of the aircraft's

record upon the relationship between McDonnell Douglas and their
customers.

Correcting problems in this area is central to a

crisis marketing strategy.
Relations between McDonnell Douglas and American
Airlines were extremely strained following the Chicago
disaster.

The assignment of blame for the crash was the key

21Minot (North Dakota) Daily News, 29 November 1979, p. 1.
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issue.

Heated charges from both companies appeared in print

concerning the use of forklifts by American Airlines maintenance
personnel to service DC-10 engines.

This has been cited by the

FAA as the primary cause for the damage to the pylon which led
the crash at O'Hare.
Sanford McDonnell, president and chief executive
officer of McDonnell Douglas stated:
valued customer has a problem.

"It's very awkward when a

But the fact is, they damaged

the plane severely by using a very crude maintenance technique,
and we have to call a spade a spade.•
John Brizendine added:

22

Douglas president

"I don't believe that American should

try to duck responsibility for what it did.•

23

Douglas service bulletins 54-48 and 54-49 explained in
detail the recommended procedures for removing and replacing the
engine on a DC-10.

In addition, the DC-10 maintenance service

manual outlined a forty-four step procedure for this operation.
These publications stated that the engine and pylon should be
removed separately.

The use of a forklift was not specifically

addressed.
American Airlines had requested guidance from McDonnell
Douglas on procedures concerning engine maintenance.

McDonnell

Douglas did not respond directly to their questions and only

22"Douglas Aircraft Denies Agreeing to DC-10 Pylon
Modifications," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 October
1979, p. 36.
23Ibid.
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stated that airlines may occasionally wish to change certain
procedures.
Senior vice president of operations for American
Airlines, Donald J. Lloyd-Jones, charged that McDonnell Douglas
was aware of the use of forklifts during engine maintenance.
"McDonnell Douglas representatives have been present on
subsequent occasions when pylon changes have been made.

Our

people are skilled in the procedure, and we have no reason at
all to believe that it is in any way responsible for the defects

our vigorous inspections have uncoveredoi'

He later added:

''We

are perplexed and disturbed that McDonnell Douglas has taken aim
at an industry procedure that it has been aware of, has
participated in, and never objected to.•

24

McDonnell Douglas

denied that it was aware of the maintenance procedure.

The FAA

fined American Airlines $500,000 in November for the
unauthorized use of forklifts to service DC-10 engines.
European carriers were also greatly disturbed over the
grounding of the DC-10, but their disagreement was with the FAA
and not McDonnell Douglas.

Although the FAA had no jurisdiction

in Europe, they did prevent all DC-lOs from operating at
American airports.

European carriers charged that the United

States was violating international law by prohibiting DC-lOs
with European airworthiness certificates from operating within
the United States.

Most European carriers had returned the

24David M. North, "DC-10 Type Certificate Lifted,
"Aviation week & Space Technology, 11 June 1979, p. 50.
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aircraft to operation after inspections were completed.
McDonnell Douglas officials had worked with the European Civil
Aviation Conference on returning DC-lOs to service.

Turkey,

where DC-10 credibility was still low, was the last European
nation to restore the DC-10 to operation.
The grounding of the DC-10 also caused severe financial
losses for the American customers of McDonnell Douglas.
accounted for 23% of United Airlines seat rniles. 25

DC-lOs

DC-Bs and

Boeing 727s picked up some of the slack for the carrier.
Northwest, World, National, Western, and Continental were among
the other ~~erican carriers seriously affected.

In some cases,

DC-10 crew members and flight attendants were temporarily
dismissed by the airlines.

Continental was forced to suspend

all of its Pacific operations, as the DC-10 was the only

iii'
i'i:

aircraft in its inventory with the range required for their
flights.
Customer perceptions about the DC-10 played a big part
in purchase decisions.

Alitalia Airlines immediately withdrew

an order for six DC-lOs after the Chicago crash.

Boeing later

i>
11

I
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sold nine 747s to the Italian carrier.
over an order for four DC-lOs.

Egypt also had doubts

McDonnell Douglas saw this as an

important effort to penetrate the Middle East market.

Even the

Senate was hesitant about continuing funding for the KC-10
project.

An attachment to the final 1980 defense authorization

25•Grounding Disruption Slight in East, Midwest," Aviation
Week & Space Technology, 4 June 1979, p. 13.

'
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bill stated that structural problems with the DC-10 would have
to be cleared up before granting contracts for the aircraft.
Other customers continued to adamantly support the
DC-10.

Sir Freddie Laker lost $15 million during the grounding,

but still expressed confidence in the aircraft.

He had five

DC-lOs on order at the time of the Chicago crash for operation
on his transatlantic routes.
since 1971.

Swissair had been using DC-lOs

Armin Baltensweiler, president of Swissair,

expressed 100% confidence in the aircraft and indicated that the
three 1979 crashes had nothing to do with the structure of the
.
f t. 26
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DC-10 Marketing Efforts
Before the 1979 crashes, McDonnell Douglas and the
DC-10 had already become firmly established in the American,
European, and western Pacific market areas.

Initial and repeat

sales were very good in these regions and McDonnell Douglas was
beginning concentrated efforts to supplement this by expanding
geographically.

The Middle East and Africa were seen as

potential market areas.

One prediction called for the number of

Boeing 747s and DC-lOs needed in Africa to at least triple by
the early 1990s.

27

McDonnell Douglas had successfully done

little in these areas up to the time of the problems which

26"Swissair Plans to Place Order with Boeing Company for
Three to Five Jets," The Wall Street Journal, 5 December 1979,
p. 12.
27"Africa Emerges as Special Market," Aviation Week &
Space Technology, 11 June 1979, p. 249.
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occurred in 1979.
The corporation was also trying to further penetrate
the British market with the Rolls-Royce powered DC-10 which was
mentioned earlier.

McDonnell Douglas believed that this would

be an inducement to the state-owned British Airways to purchase
DC-lOs.
McDonnell Douglas has on occasion made rather unique
financing arrangements with clients in order to sell aircraft,
especially when a new market area is involved.

In one example,

marketing personnel at the Douglas Aircraft Division helped
Yugoslavia sell Tomos mopeds in the United States in order to
raise cash for purchasing DC-9s and DC-lOs.

An earlier

operation involved selling Yugoslavian hams in this country for
a similar purpose.
The high sales figures for the DC-10 at the start of
1979 show that McDonnell Douglas had been very successful in
marketing the DC-10.

A great deal of this momentum was lost,

however, as a result of the negative publicity surrounding the
aircraft as a result of the crashes.
an indication of this.

The cancelled orders are

The next section looks at the steps

which McDonnell Douglas took to regain this lost momentum.
McDonnell Douglas' efforts to restore customer
confidence in the DC-10 began to appear in the media in the
middle of 1980.

It was clear to the corporation that some type

of crisis marketing action was necessary.

McDonnell Douglas

28

received only twelve firm orders for the DC-10 in 1980.
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This

was sharply down from the 1979 level of twenty-four.
They began a magazine and television advertising
campaign.

The advertising featured former Apollo astronaut Pete

Conrad, Jr.

He cited the safety, skill, and technology which are

a part of the aircraft and its design, comparing these efforts to
those which went into the Apollo program.

McDonnell Douglas

feels that the television spots were well received.

This is

based on the fact that more people flew on the DC-10 than on any
other wide-body during the last months of 1980.

It is difficult,

however, to draw a direct correlation between these two facts.
McDonnell Douglas also purchased large advertisements in
several national magazines.
the general public.

These advertisements were aimed at

They stressed the fact that a large number

of carriers use the DC-10, that it is well-designed, and that it
is very versatile which ultimately saves the passenger money.
Earlier advertisements had been directed to the airlines
and other potential users of large aircraft.

In 1980, there was

a clear shift to the public orientation following the crashes.
For example, in 1978, Douglas Aircraft Marketing provided an
address at the bottom of its advertisements for obtaining an
analysis of the DC-10 on various popular airline routes.

This

was replaced in 1980 by an address for a pamphlet entitled,
"Surprising But True."

This booklet was a public oriented

28"Fighting the Fears of the DC-10," Newsweek, 18 May
1981, p. 17.
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presentation of general facts about the DC-10 and its history.
Apparently, McDonnell Douglas felt that restoring confidence in
the DC-10 would be accomplished by a grassroots effort.
The company also tried to reestablish confidence at
home.

The Long Beach plant handed out iron-on transfers and

bumper stickers that said, "I'm Proud of the DC-10.''
sold DC-10 shirts in the plant store.

They also

In a more substantive

gesture, the United Auto and Aerospace Workers Union at Douglas
purchased 20,000 shares of McDonnell Douglas stock in an
organized drive by the members.
In summary, the McDonnell Douglas Corporation recognized
and responded to the problems of continued sales of the DC-10 by
launching a television and magazine campaign aimed at the general
public.

The company began its efforts approximately one year

after the events which caused the crisis marketing situation.
Several efforts were also made to bolster confidence of the
company's workers.
Summary
Chapter II outlined the specific facts of this crisis
marketing case .. Relevant information concerning the McDonnell
Douglas Corporation, the DC-10 aircraft, the history of problems,
customer relations, and marketing was presented.

These facts

will be used in Chapter III to analyze crisis marketing with the
framework that the crisis marketing model will provide.
The McDonnell Douglas Corporation is a large
multinational aircraft and missile producer with a large portion
of business coming from the civilian sector.

The DC-10 is a key
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component in this sector and is a crucial element in the overall
company product mix.

Since early in its history, the DC-10 has

had problems and accidents.

Three crashes occurred in 1979 and

this was the peak of difficulty for McDonnell Douglas.
Investigations of the crashes showed that only the Paris crash of
1974 directly involved the aircraft design or structure.

The

1979 accidents were attributable to maintenance technique and
pilot errors.

Still, many customer accounts were lost or

jeopardized.
Prior to the 1979 crashes of the DC-10, McDonnell
Douglas had a large and secure market for the aircraft.
were being made to expand this even further.

Efforts

Advertising was

aimed primarily at potential buyers of the DC-10 and there was
little ~irect relations with the general public.

Most of the

corporation's efforts were devoted to penetrating new markets and
in making the financial arrangements for DC-10 purchases.
After 1979, McDonnell Douglas took no immediate action.
Eventually, poor sales showed that the firm needed to take some
type of crisis marketing action.

They launched a national

magazine and television campaign aimed at the general public.
McDonnell Douglas cited figures showing increasing numbers of
passengers on DC-lOs as evidence that the campaign was working.
Other reasons may have caused this increase.
evaluate the long-term effect on sales.

It is too early to

CHAPTER III
A CRISIS MARKETING MODEL:
Proposal

Introduction

Chapter III will present a seven-step crisis marketing
model.

This model is general enough that it can be used across

a relatively wide spectrum of crisis marketing situations.

The

model includes the important areas relevant to most cases.

A

manager using this system may wish to add or delete steps as
appropriate.
The section following the discussion of the model will
be an application of the model using the McDonnell Douglas DC-10
example.

This crisis marketing case will use the information

provided in Chapter II to fill in the framework that the model
provides.
The objective of this chapter is to demonstrate how
actual information and proposals can be applied.

It will

establish a basis of comparison for other crisis marketing cases.
General Crisis Marketing Model
The first step in this crisis marketing model is to
identify the problem.

This may seem to be a simple process, but

there are important factors to be considered in this area.
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first is timing.

It is essential that the problem be identified

early and properly.

As stated in Chapter I, a crisis marketing

situation may arise for a product due to negative publicity,
conspicuous failure, or any other damaging set of
circumstances.

A decrease in sales is usually a symptom.

A

company must immediately consider the possibility of crisis
marketing for its product should any of the above situation
occur.

A delay will result in lost sales that could progress

geometrically.
The next important consideration is the degree and
intensity of the problem.

This can be measured by polls,

surveys, and other means of contacting the general public and/or
customers.

Projective testing is one excellent way to discern

true feelings and attitudes of customers.

The respondent is

I'

asked to indicate how a third person would evaluate the
product.
feelings.

In actuality, the respondent is revealing his own true
1

The extent of the problem will have a large impact

on several of the steps which follow in the model.
Once a problem requiring crisis marketing has been
recognized and measured, one must determine the objectives of
the campaign to counter the negative situation.
two.

The objectives will often involve sales figures, but there

are other possible measures.

!

II
J

!
i

This is step

They may include such things as

lMason Haire, "Projective Techniques in Marketing
Research," in Reading in Marketing, ed., Philip R. Cateora and
Lee Richardson, (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967), pp.
149-159.
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prestige and status of the company involved.
should be concrete and measurable.

These objectives

This allows for better

resource allocation, setting of priorities and deadlines, and
the assignment of responsibility for success.

2

Step three is an evaluation of your firm and its
capabilities.

This is a prerequisite for determining options

for further action.

It is important to understand how the

campaign will affect your company as a whole and what your
limitations appear to be.
area.

Financial position is one important

One must determine the amount of resources available for

use in a crisis marketing campaign.

The capabilities of the

company's public relations and advertising staff should be
considered.

It could be possible that the problem is beyond the

ability of the firm's staff to accommodate.

If this is the

case, outside help should be considered.
The history and prestige of a company is another
consideration.
public image.

Companies place varying degrees of importance on
A producer that values its reputation to a high

degree would be more likely to undertake a large marketing
effort when needed.

A low quality high volume producer would

probably be less concerned over a deficiency in one of their
products.
Finally, the product mix of the company is crucial to

2Arthur A. Thompson, Jr., and A. J. Strickland III,
Strategy and Policy: Concepts and Cases (Plano, Texas:
Business Publications, Inc., 1981), p. 11.
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crisis marketing.

The importance and relative position of the

product should be analyzed.

If the product is the heart of the

company, then a serious problem exists.

If the product is a

relatively minor part of the overall product line, then the
company is in a better position to withstand the negative
consequences.
Product evaluation is step four.

The first

consideration and perhaps the most subjective is determining the
product's place within the industry.

If the product is a highly

visible leader in the field or moving toward the top, crisis
marketing could be especially important.

If the product is in

the lower part of its field, it probably would not be hurt too
much more by the crisis situation.

In these two cases, the

objectives of the campaign would be different.

In the first

case, reputation and market relative market position would be
critical.

In the second situation, mere survival of the product

would be the central consideration.

I

I

The cost of a product to make should be a factor to be
included in the model.

If a product is highly technical,

I

consists of expensive components, or requires a great deal of

I!

labor, crisis marketing is more important.

I

!

J
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have a large investment to protect.

The company would

This would not be the case

in a simple and inexpensive item.
A product's life cycle should be analyzed.
four commonly recognized stages to the life cycle.

There are
Increases in

sales are most pronounced in the introductory and growth
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stages. 3

If a product is in these early stages, there may be

more incentive to attempt crisis marketing in order to recover
development and start-up costs.

In a case where the product is

in decline, crisis marketing could be a wasted effort.
The most important issue in evaluating the product is
the reason for the failure or negative publicity.
cases, the product may not be to blame.

In some

The circumstances and

details of the failure should be evaluated prior to developing
options in step six.

If the product is to blame, the key is to

minimize the damage caused.

If the product is not at fault,

then the campaign should stress this point.
Step five is an analysis of the product's customers.
Relevant considerations include whether the product is an
industrial good or a consumer good.

The market for industrial

goods in the United States and abroad is geographically
concentrated and buyers use a more systematic method to purchase
the products than do consumer buyers.

4

Customer attitudes must also be evaluated.

The degree

of confidence and support for the product must be measured.
This will assist in planning the scope of the crisis marketing
campaign.

If attitudes are extremely negative, a bigger effort

would be required.
The history of relations between the producer and the

3Louis E. Boone and David L. Kurtz, Foundations of
Marketing (Hinsdale, Ill.: Dryden Press, 1977), pp. 166-168.
4rbid., p. 108.
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customers will be a factor in how the problem with the product
is addressed.

A long time and frequent client should warrant a

special effort to maintain confidence.
Mutual dependence is a factor.

The extent to which the

customers need the product and how much the producer depends on
the negatively influenced buyers enters into the overall
situation.

If the customer can easily switch to another

producer with a similar product, efforts to maintain sales will
be more difficult and perhaps impossible.
Step six is the heart of the model.
selection of a crisis marketing option.

It involves the

The action taken should

be chosen as a result of reviewing the factors compromising the
first five steps.
The first possible course of action is to do nothing.
This may be the best option if the product is inexpensive,
declining in popularity, or fits into some of the categories
just mentioned that do not warrant a large effort to save the
product.
If the company feels that there is a good chance of
I

I

I

future sales growth or has a large investment in the product to
protect, then crisis marketing action should be attempted.

The

i

focus, scope, methods, and message should all be selected with

I

respect to objectives after the review of the company, product,

I
I

and customer.

I
I
Ii

campaign.

Focus means selecting the right target for the

Generally, this will be the people with the ability

II

and need to buy the product.

I

effort.

B

R
1

!
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Scope refers to the amount of the

This can range from a massive media blitz to brief
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contacts with clients.
media.

Methods involve selecting the right

The objective is adequate media coverage within the

selected focus area.

Alternative costs should be compared to

determine the best possible media purchase. 5
message should be carefully selected.

Finally, the

Efforts to successfully

reach the correct people are wasted if the message is
ineffective.
Step seven is determining results of the campaign and
making adjustments.

This can be a continuous process lasting

several years past the crisis situation.

It is necessary to

know how effective the crisis marketing efforts have been.

The

methods used in step one are applicable at this step to
determine if progress has been made.

This evaluation may

provide information indicating that errors or miscalculations
occurred on previous steps.

If this is the case, corrections

can be made and measurements once again taken.
continues until acceptable results are reached.

The cycle
It requires a

good manager to prevent these adjustments from becoming a matter
of trial-and-error.
A Case for Specific Comparison
McDonnell Douglas was slow in responding to their
crisis marketing situation.
company took action.

It was a full year before the

This was after orders were cancelled in

1979 and 1980 sales dropped sharply.
•

I
I
*It
I

5rbid., p. 348.

They did take action to

FIGURE 2

CRISIS MARKETING OUTLINE

STEP ONE

Identify the Problem
a)
early detection necessary
b) measure intensity of problem

STEP TWO

Determine Objectives of the Crisis Marketing Efforts
a)
b)
c)

STEP THREE

Evaluate the Company
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

STEP FOUR

industrial or consumer clients
attitude of buyers
mutual dependence

Selection of Options
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)

STEP SEVEN

competition
costs and profit margins
life cycle
reason for failure

Evaluate the Customers
a)
b)
c)

STEP SIX

financial position
market area and size
public relations capabilities
importance of company's prestige
product mix

Evaluate the Product
a)
b)
c)
d)

STEP FIVE

efforts to protect sales
efforts to protect reputation of firm
other objectives

do nothing
focus
scope
method
message

Determine Results and make Adjustments
a)
reaccomplish Step One and determine progress
b)
adjust previous steps as required
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determine the degree of the problem by commissioning a survey.
The results showed that a campaign was necessary.

This points

out the fact that a company may not always immediately recognize
when it has become involved in a crisis marketing situation.
This case also demonstrates how quickly sales can decline if no
early action is taken.
The objective of the McDonnell Douglas campaign was not
clear.

The fact that the company was pleased that more people

were riding the DC-10 in late 1980 may indicate that this was an
objective.
factors.

Preserving sales and reputation probably were
Based on the content of the McDonnell Douglas

advertisements, it appeared that they sought to improve the
public image of the DC-10.

Even if they were successful, there

would be no certainty that this public acceptance would have an
effect on sales.
Step three was an evaluation of the corporation.
Several facts concerning this case should be analyzed.

First,

McDonnell Douglas is a multinational corporation with extensive
financial resources.

They certainly have the ability in terms

of money and personnel to launch a large campaign.

It was also

apparent to McDonnell Douglas that the potential financial
impact of not conducting a campaign would be worse than doing
nothing.
McDonnell Douglas relied heavily on its reputation.
They were seen as a leader in a highly technical field.
concept of product failure could be especially damaging.
corporation also had close relations with its clients.

The
The
This
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resulted from the fact that only selected organizations
purchased DC-lOs and they would then require close technical
support from the factory.

The importance of these customers

warranted a large effort on the part of McDonnell Douglas to
maintain their confidence.
Finally, the DC-10 was an integral part of the
company's product mix.

It was their largest aircraft and most

modern civilian transport.

The company could not afford not to

attempt crisis marketing due to the importance of the DC-10.

If

the DC-10 sales were to drastically fall, the impact would be
severely felt throughout the entire company.
One of the most important issues of the DC-10 case is
the reasons for the product's problems.
product was not primarily at fault.

In this instance, the

It did, however, receive a

great deal of negative publicity and this is what prompted the
crisis marketing efforts.

The fact that the product was sound

was one of the strongest positive points that McDonnell Douglas
had in its favor and they failed to utilize it.
McDonnell Douglas was in a favorable position in terms
of its customers.

There were few clients and that should have

made reaching and influencing them an easier task.

Determining

attitudes could have been accomplished faster and been a more
personal matter.

In addition, the airlines depended on

McDonnell Douglas for advice, parts, and service information in
order to keep their fleets of DC-lOs operating.

It would be

difficult for an airline to switch aircraft types due to the
large outlays already committed in pilot training and equipment

4.1

designed to repair and service DC-10 aircraft.

Once again,

McDonnell Douglas failed to take advantage of these positive
factors.

For this reason, they selected a poor option in step

six of the crisis marketing model.

They failed to build upon

the key points that previous steps should have brought out.
McDonnell Douglas focused on the general public when
the airlines were the actual customers of the company.

The

scope was larger than necessary because they attempted to reach
an unnecessarily large audience.
would have been more effective.

Direct contact with the buyers
This assumes, of course, that

the objective of McDonnell Douglas was financial and not
strictly related to reputation.

The message did not include the

strongest argument that could have been made by the company;
that the product was safe and other factors caused the problem.
Lastly, McDonnell Douglas has taken no action to
determine the effect that its crisis marketing efforts have had
other than citing the larger loads that DC-lOs now carry.

It is

a mistake to wait until sales figures answer the question as to
the effectiveness of the campaign.
Summary
The first section of Chapter III presented a seven-step
approach to crisis marketing.

The general model was used in the

next section to review the case of the McDonnell Douglas DC-10.
Both the model and the example of a practical application should
be useful in addressing future crisis marketing situations.
Some of the steps will have varying degrees of importance in
different cases, but all provide a guide for the evaluation and
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selection process.

Whether all are used is up to the individual

manager.
The interrelationship between the steps is important to
understand.

They should not be viewed as isolated parts.

Instead, they combine to form the overall picture which results
in the selection of the one best crisis marketing option.

;
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CHAPTER IV
CONCLUSION

Introduction

The conclusion of this paper will review the previous
chapters and show the interrelationship between them.

This

progressive development leads to the application of the facts of
the McDonnell Douglas DC-10 crisis marketing case to the model
which has been presented.

Chapter I explained the format,

purpose, and limitations of the paper.

This allowed the reader

to follow this pattern of development from the early stages.
Chapter II presented the facts of the DC-10 case which were used
in Chapter III to illustrate the application of the model.
Chapter IV summarizes and reviews the paper.
Review of Project
The purpose of this paper was to present a crisis
marketing model and demonstrate its application.

This model has

been developed from a variety of marketing information sources.
This information has been synthesized into a checklist.

The

model has been kept general so that it is useful in a broad
range of applications.
Crisis marketing was defined in the paper as the
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attempt to market a product after extreme negative publicity,
conspicuous failure, or any other event which injures customer
relations and general public opinion to a high degree.

The

model has been specifically designed for this type of situation.
The DC-10 case was selected to illustrate the use of
the model because it is an excellent example of crisis
marketing.

The elements of negative publicity, product failure,

and poor customer relations were all certainly present.

In

addition, a great deal of information was available on the DC-10
case from many sources.

Other cases of crisis marketing have

existed, but limiting analysis to one case allowed for more
detailed discussion and development.

The next section reviews

the relevant facts of the DC-10 case.
Review of Facts
There were several key elements of the McDonnell
Douglas DC-10 case that were analyzed in Chapter II.

These

elements were selected because it was felt that they were the
most important variables to consider when applying the crisis
marketing checklist.

Other variables may be added to the model

and discussion in different crisis marketing situations.
The characteristics of the McDonnell Douglas
Corporation were the first factors to be considered.
company is a large multinational firm.

The

It has production

facilities throughout North America and in England.

The firm

relies on government contracts for much of its business.

In

this case, however, the product involved in the crisis marketing
situation was primarily sold to the civilian sector.

The
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balance sheet presented in figure one showed that McDonnell
Douglas is in a relatively strong financial position.

This

means resources were available for a crisis marketing campaign
if necessary.

It also meant the company could absorb some

losses in sales and continue to operate.
The company's product mix was also discussed.

This

established the relative position of the DC-10 within the firm
as a whole.
The next section discussed the DC-10 project in more
detail.

It showed how the aircraft was designed for one of the

company's best customers.

A break-even point was established as

a reference to determine future sales requirements.

The DC-10

was also compared to its closest competition, the Boeing 747 and
the Lockheed L-1011.

It is necessary to know how the market

perceives the product with respect to the near competition both
before and after the crisis situation.

Finally, a few future

DC-10 options were presented.
The events causing the DC-10 problems were addressed
next.

It was shown that the DC-10 has had a long series of

accidents.

Early difficulties resulted from the General

Electric engines and the rear cargo door.
problems were corrected.

Both of these

The DC-10 then enjoyed a relatively

accident-free period for five years until 1979.

In that year,

three DC-lOs crashed and gave rise to the crisis marketing
situation.

Two of these crashes, however, resulted from pilot

error and the third was primarily due to poor maintenance
procedures.

d

These are crucial facts to consider in marketing
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the aircraft.
McDonnell Douglas was slow in responding to the
customer and publicity problems.

They eventually launched an

advertising campaign directed to the general public.

Figures

were cited showing that more people were riding DC-lOs, but a
close correlation is questionable.
Review of Model
Chapter III outlined the crisis marketing model.
consisted of several general steps.

It

The first two steps

involved identifying the problem and determining objectives of
the campaign.

Steps three to five were evaluations of the

company, product, and customers.

These provide information

needed to select the best option at step six in accordance with
the objectives.

The final step was evaluation and revision.

Continual adjustments may be necessary to better achieve the
goals.

It was stressed that the model should be seen as

flexible and applicable to a variety of situations.

Since all

crisis marketing situations will vary, certain steps will be
more useful than others.

The last section of the chapter

applied the DC-10 facts as a demonstration.
Future Implications
The crisis marketing model in this paper currently
provides managers with synthesized information on this subject
and a general checklist to reference in crisis marketing
situations.

There are other steps which could be taken to

further develop and refine the model.

One possible project is a

detailed analysis of the effect of the McDonnell Douglas
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marketing efforts after sales figures for the early eighties
become available.

This would show how effective measures taken

by the company have been.
A second project would involve reviewing other crisis
marketing situations found in the literature.

This would test

the hypothesis that similar key factors would be discovered in
each case.

Analyzing more cases would provide a broader and

more secure foundation for the model.
There are several reasons why crisis marketing will be
an important area for managers in the future.

Consumer

criticism and the increasing burden of government regulations
mean producers may face a more critical and unforgiving
marketplace.

This, combined with the public's reliance on

complex products, opens the door for a series of crisis
marketing problems in the future.
Summary
Chapter IV presented a review of the entire paper.

The

purpose, organization, and limitations were summarized first.
This included giving a working definition of crisis marketing
used throughout the paper.

The relevant facts of the DC-10 case

were reviewed and the basis for selecting them was discussed.
The crisis marketing model was also briefly summarized in this
chapter, but the best means of studying the model is to see
figure two.

Throughout the paper, an effort was made to clearly

identify the structure that was being followed.

Hopefully, this

final section will be useful in reinforcing this organization in
the mind of the reader.
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